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Abstract— A century after the collapse of Ottoman empire, Turkey is trying to bridge the gaps again with the 
Balkans, some calling it a way of reviving the Ottoman empire, while as few see it as a way of making allies in 
the region to join European Union. There are many such narratives.  This paper will try to analyze how Turkey 
is trying to make its presence strong in Balkans, whether it is investing in their education, building religious 
monuments, or bringing stability and peace in the region. This paper will also focus on the growing relations 
between Turkey and Balkans during the ongoing governance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ottoman Empire was spread over the majority of the Balkan 
region. The people of all the religions were acceptable in the 
Ottoman Empire. But after the fall of Ottoman Empire, the 
situation changed drastically. With the exception of Albania 
being a Muslim majority population, the Muslims were left as 
minorities in other nation states of Balkan region. The internal 
tension between majority and minority populations triggered 
in the region. Tensions were particularly evident between new 
orthodox Christian rulers and their Muslim minority 
populations, which were seen as undesirable relics from the 
Ottoman past (Poulton, 2000).  
Hundreds of thousands of Turks had settled down in the small 
Balkan cities. After the empire collapsed, there was a massive 
migration of ethnic Turks and Muslims to Turkey. Beholding 
this overwhelming arrival of people of Balkan origin, Turkey 
started viewing Balkans as a part of their hinterland. But under 
the single party rule of the Republican Party, the Turkey’s 
relationship with Balkans remained very formal. Turkey was 
absent in Balkans for almost a century. It was only after the 
end of cold war that Turkey was forced to change its foreign 
policy towards the disintegrated Soviet Union and Balkans. 
International dynamics pressured Turkey to change its 
priorities and that was when Balkans became a nucleus of their 
priorities. The Turkish armed forces have been actively 
involved in the United Nations Protection Force, 
Implementation Force, Stabilization Force in Bosnia 
Herzegovina; Operation Alba in Albania; Essential Harvest, 
Amber Fox, Concordia, Proxima in Macedonia; and the 
United Nations, Mission in Kosovo, OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission and Kosovo Force (Demirtaş, 2013). 
Turkey’s Interest in Balkans 
For the past two decades, Turkey has been rediscovering its 
relationship with Balkans. The end of cold war and the 
dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s and the 
subsequent violence in Bosnia and Kosovo were the decisive 
points for Turkey to get actively involved in the Balkans. 
Joining the multilateral forces, Turkey was seen in putting a 
greater emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Muslims 
suffered greatly during the Bosnian war (1992-1995). And 
when the Kosovo war broke out in 1999, and throughout the 
long-standing dispute between the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia and Greece over the name ‘Macedonia’, Turkey 
strived for a mediator’s role in the region (Vracic, 2016). 
There are multiple narratives for Turkey being so interested in 
Balkans. Starting from creating neo-Ottomanism to using 
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Balkans as a key to enter the realm of world economy. Since 
Balkan region bridges Turkey with west, Turkey has started 
showing a lot of interest. Erhan Türbedar cites five reasons for 
Turkey being involved In Balkans. The first being the 
common history of Turks and Balkans. Although there have 
been conflicts regarding this commonality too, still they have 
a lot to identify with each other. The second factor is the 
human factor; the ethnic Turks living in the Balkans. The 
official statistics say that there are almost one million Turkish 
minorities living in Balkans.  Now that Turkey has been lately 
called as the Messiah of Muslims in the world, their support 
goes for the Non-Turkish Muslims living in Balkans as well. 
The third factor being trade, fourth as geography and last but 
not the least as to make allies in the region to make it to the 
membership of the European Union (Türbedar, 2011) 
All of these factors can be true as well as debatable at the same 
time. They are totally interrelated in nature. But Turkey is not 
seen to be primarily focusing on all the Balkan countries. It is 
focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia. These are the areas that have the Muslim 
minorities and the ethnic Turks.  
Turkey and, Bosnian War of 1995 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, witnessed the deadliest massacre in 
history. On 6th July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces Under General 
Ratko Mladic began an assault on Srebrenica. The UN report 
stated that Bosnian Serbs had murdered around 7600 Bosnian 
Muslim males, but this figure kept changing. More than 
200,000 Bosnians were killed including 17000 children. 
Thousands were injured and millions were left homeless.  
Turkey couldn’t intervene anyway in Bosnian war except 
through NATO. But NATO had its own way to work and 
Turkish elites had a grave concern for the Muslims that were 
becoming the greatest casualty of the war. The Turkish 
embassy served as a NATO contact for Bosnia while also 
acting as a mentor in the process. Although this role is 
normally assumed by a NATO member for a duration of one 
year, Turkey has – based on its explicit expression of strong 
interest – been able to keep it for two consecutive years 
(Vracic, 2016). 
The Turkey’s then Minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu called Bosnia the miniature of the Balkans, because 
of having Islam as its religious heritage, Ottoman influenced 
art and the common Turkish words. During the Bosnian war 
of 1992, Turkey was seen quite worried about the Bosnian 
conflict. President Süleyman Demirel made a powerful speech 
calling for an action, “I can say a new wave of bloodshed is 
coming. I stated my worries to world leaders after my return 
from Bosnia. I continue to voice the drama of our Bosnian 
brothers at every international forum and bilateral contacts.” 
Muzafer Çilek, an honorary council of Bosnia to Bursa 
attended one of the teleconferences with President Recep 
Tayipp Erdoğan that was for his presidential campaigning, 
mentioning that if Erdoğan is elected as the president of 
Turkey, he will be the President of Bosnia as well (Beylur, 
2013). 
Kosovo and Turkey 
Kosovo has been struggling for two things so far, one is 
independence and second is to be recognized as an 
independent country internationally. The independence was 
declared in 2008 so far but the recognition is yet a faraway 
dream. Turkey has been supporting the Kosovo independence 
since the beginning for the number of reasons. The Turkish 
government believed that to achieve the stability and peace in 
the western Balkans, Kosovo needed to be resolved through 
independence. When the conflict was going on in Kosovo in 
the second half of 1990’s, Turkish politicians discussed the 
future of Kosovo and Turkish policies in the region. It should 
also be noted that Turkey’s recognition of Kosovo did not lead 
to any deterioration in its relations with Serbia; in other words, 
both countries “agreed to disagree” on the issue of Kosovo 
(Demirtaş, 2013). 
Turkey is having very good economic relations with Kosovo. 
Of the six countries in the Western Balkans, Kosovo has 
attracted the highest level of FDI from Turkey over last five 
years. In terms of investments, and according to the Central 
Bank of Kosovo, Turkey invested €86.8 million in 2013 alone. 
From 2004 to 2014 investments amounted to €360 million – 
12 percent of total foreign investments. 
 Areas of Turkish services in Balkans 
Turkey has been actively offering services in Balkans, in the 
form of education, trade and investment, energy sector, 
construction, communication and mining sectors. Turkey has 
been highly investing in their education sector through an 
organization called Diyanet that runs the educational 
institutions in Balkans. Let’s detail few major sectors where 
Turkey invests hugely: 
Education 
Education has been one of the soft power policies of Turkey 
in the Balkans. Due to the economic weaknesses the Balkan 
governments haven’t been able to invest much in their 
education sector that is why they welcome the initiatives of 
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Turkey in the Balkan’s education sector. The Turkish 
government offers scholarships programs for university 
education to the western Balkan students, at the undergraduate 
and graduate levels, one can add the influence of increasing 
number of Turkish universities in various Balkan countries, 
such as Epoka University in Albania, the International 
University of Sarajevo and the International Burch University 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (Ekinci, 2018). 
The Yunus Emre institutes, which has offices in all the 
western Balkan countries are used to teach Turkish language 
and culture of Turkey. The recently found Maarif-vakfi 
foundation that was made as an alternative to US based 
Fetullah Gülen’s international schools in Balkans. The 
Diyanet foundation is used to create religious awareness 
among the Muslims in the western Balkans. The Imam Hatip 
schools in Turkey also provide religious education apart from 
the formal education. A recently established institution called 
YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related communities) 
gives thousands of scholarships every year. Considering the 
holders of Turkish grants from the Balkan countries the 
number increased from 467 in 1992 to 721 in 2011.  
Trade and investment 
It was under the Turgut Özal’s period that Turkey’s foreign 
policy changed towards Balkans. It was more of Turkey had 
started remembering Balkans after such a long time. The 
practice of taking the businessmen along on the foreign trips 
was started by him but then that was stopped by the coalition 
governments. And then Justice and development party 
resumed this practice and it can be seen now that President 
Recep Tayip Erdoğan usually takes a huge group of Business 
persons along while going on his trips abroad. Turkey’s trade 
volume with the Balkan countries was just US $ 2.9 billion in 
2000, increasing to US $ 18.4 billion in 2011, a six-fold 
increase. There was also a similar increase in Turkish direct 
investment in the region: In 2002 it totaled about US $ 30 
million; and it increased to US $ 189 million in 2011. 
In terms of Turkey`s yearly outward FDI to the Balkans 
region, Bulgaria and Romania exclusively the recipient 
countries until 2004. From that year onwards, the rest of the 
Balkan countries have undertaken important economic 
reforms in order to attract more FDI to integrate with the 
global economy. As a result of rapid liberalization process and 
bilateral agreements signed with Turkey, Turkish investments 
began to flow in to the Balkans region. Turkey`s FDI flow of 
investment into the Balkan countries has been relatively 
diversified. For instance, in 2007, Albania alone received 
42.2% of total outward FDI from Turkey. This large FDI 
inflow of investment into the country is a reflection of foreign 
participation in the partial privatization of Albania’s public 
telecommunication company ALBtelecom, which was 
acquired by a Turkish consortium in 2007. Moreover, Turkey 
became the fifth country having the largest share in FDI stocks 
in Albania in 2011 (Çakir, 2014). 
Turkey’s presence is felt in sectors such as banking (Bosnia, 
Macedonia, and Kosovo) and increasingly transport. In late 
2008, Turkish Airways acquired a 49% stake in BIH Airlines, 
the national carrier. It has also been involved in prolonged 
negotiations over the purchase of a controlling stake in 
Serbia’s JAT. Turkish companies have won contracts to 
operate the airports in Pristina, Skopje and Ohrid too. In 
Macedonia, the condition has been investing EUR 200m into 
the airports’ infrastructure (Bechev, 2012). 
Media 
Another important proof of soft power is the increasing 
interest in Turkish media in the Balkan countries. The launch 
of a new channel by the Turkish radio and TV broadcasting 
organization TRT, called TRT Avaz, is a noteworthy 
development. It broadcasts some cultural programs as well as 
daily news in the Balkan languages, and hence has a potential 
to be a cultural bridge. Another salient recent development has 
been the opening of the Directorate of the Region of the 
Balkans in the Anatolian News Agency (Anadolu Ajansı, AA) 
in Sarajevo last year. 
Nonetheless, Turkish mass media, such as soap operas, 
especially those which portray Turkey as a modern, secular 
and open country, have found an enthusiastic audience in all 
Western Balkan countries. And as no citizen of a Western 
Balkan country needs a visa for Turkey, years of increased 
people-to-people contact through tourism has boosted 
Turkey’s positive image also among the non-Muslim societies 
in Western Balkans. 
TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency) 
Recently, the Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA) has paid much attention to the 
reconstruction of historic Ottoman monuments throughout the 
Balkans. Turkey is also building schools and universities in 
those parts where they are likely to be appreciated, for 
example in areas with a predominantly Muslim population. As 
an example, in Montenegro, the smallest of the post-Yugoslav 
republics, most of the €5 million that has been donated thus 
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far has focused on projects in the northern parts of the country 
where there is a significant Muslim population.15 TIKA has 
financed the reconstruction of a school in Rožaje, selected 
because over 200 of its students take Turkish as their elective 
course. Also, it has financed the building and opening of the 
madrasa in Tuzi, near Podgorica—the first Muslim religious 
school in Montenegro since 1918 (Petrovic & Relijic, 2011). 
Military and security cooperation 
Through bilateral agreements, Turkey provides military 
training, logistics, and technical support for the modernization 
of Western Balkan military forces. Turkish and other NATO 
member’s armed forces participate in collective military 
maneuvers and cooperate in international military missions. 
Turkey also supports local police forces through the training 
of officers and the supplying of equipment. 
The projection of Turkish “hard power” in the region has been 
up to recently confined to participation in NATO and EU 
missions, but Ankara has been strengthening its military and 
defense links with all countries of the region and every state 
in the Western Balkans that wants to join NATO enjoys strong 
Turkish support. 
During the past two decades, Turkey has been one of the most 
fervent supporters of Macedonia’s accession to NATO. 
Turkey has participated in all three NATO operations in 
Macedonia, Essential Harvest (2001), Amber Fox (2001-
2003) and Allied Harmony (2002- 2003) (Petrovic & Relijic, 
2011). 
Regional peace and Security 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey has tried to 
play a good role in being a mediator between Serbia and 
Bosnia to maintain peace. Although Serbia and Turkey had 
bad relations in the past because of the Turkish intervention in 
the Cyprus leading to the Turkish Greece conflict. But now 
the relations are getting better and Turkish foreign policy to 
maintain peace and stability in the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
region is to have a good relation with Serbia. Following the 
recent rapprochement, both countries chose to identify areas 
of common interest in the fields of economy, trade, tourism, 
environment, culture, multilateral cooperation and combating 
crime. They have progressed by signing a series of joint 
agreements at the governmental level and have also developed 
civil society links (Anastasakis, 2004). 
Turkish Political parties and Balkans 
 Under the single party governance of Republican Party, 
Turkey had literally sidelined Balkans, because both Turkey 
as well as Balkans were busy creating their own nationalities. 
Then came the multiparty system, but there were multiple 
coups and Turkey was quite unstable that way and moreover 
Turkey had become a member of NATO, so their policies 
were in linearity with west then. But under the governance of 
Turgut Özal in 1983, Turkey got in touch with Balkans again. 
And the legacy of keeping the Balkans was carried by Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) government under the 
leadership of President Recep Tayip Erdoğan. 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Balkans 
Since its inception, Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 
government has adopted Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ambitious 
framework for Turkish foreign policy, which involved an 
integrative and holistic utilization of the country’s 
geostrategic, social, cultural, and historical resources. 
Unsurprisingly, the Balkans is among the regions that 
Davutoğlu placed the greatest importance. In Stratejik 
Derinlik (Strategic Depth), he presents his prescriptions 
regarding Turkey’s Balkans policy mainly along three lines: 
first, he believes that in order to strengthen its influence over 
the region and maintain it both during peacetime and in case 
of tension or conflict, Turkey should primarily strengthen its 
relations with the elements connected to Turkey “with history 
and by heart” (read the Muslims) and bring the Ottoman-
Turkish cultural heritage to the fore. Second, he regards 
Turkey’s geographical, social and economic resources that 
can connect the Balkans to other nearby basins as an 
invaluable asset (Ekinci, 2014). During Erdoğan’s 15-year 
rule, Turkey has invested significant effort and money into 
gaining an ever greater political, cultural and economic 
foothold in the western Balkans. It has provided development 
aid, led major infrastructure projects, opened universities and 
restored mosques, encouraged Turkish businesses to invest in 
the region and fostered dialogue between divided 
communities 
II. CONCLUSION 
The notion of Turkey creating a new Ottoman empire might 
not be true because Balkan nation states have their own 
nationalistic space that they wouldn’t want anyone to get 
invaded. In that case Turkey can only cooperate with them not 
control them. They identify with the Balkan lands and 
wouldn’t want to be robbed off their identity again. Turkey 
can invest in their health sector more, rather than making 
schools in competition with the Gülenist institutions. 
Moreover, Turkey has to stop playing religious card in 
Balkans because then it will further fuel the religious divide. 
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